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Reforming Maine's Education Funding Process
Maine Policy Review (1998). Volume 7, Number 1

by Patrick M. Dow and Ralph Townsend
In recent years how Maine funds K-12 education has been a source of almost constant
dissension. As authors Patrick Dow and Ralph Townsend note, much of this dissension began in
the early 1990s with the Legislature's decision to reduce funding for local education. Shrinking
community budgets for local education have led to political battles over who gets what and have
led to changes in the school funding formula established in the 1970s. In this article, Dow and
Townsend argue that the recent changes to the school funding formula have eroded the
principles of equity on which the 1970s formula was built. They trace the history of education
funding in Maine, explain the mechanics of the current school funding formula, and assess the
impacts of recent changes to the formula. They conclude with a set of recommendations that call
for, in part, setting a realistic local operating cost mill rate, the removal of income and cost of
living from the formula, and modifications to the circuit breaker and homestead-exemption
programs. In future volumes, MPR hopes to include additional perspectives on this issue.
INTRODUCTION
How Maine funds elementary and secondary education has been a source of almost constant
contention in the 1990s. The roots of this contention can be found in Maine's budget problems of
the early 1990s, which led the Legislature to reduce funding of local education. As cities and
towns found their state appropriation for education declining, each community lobbied its
legislators to minimize the impact upon their own schools. This political atmosphere became
known at "printout politics," because the computer printouts that showed winners and losers
became a central component of the debate over educational funding. As a result of this overt
political competition, Maine has gradually undermined the principle of equalizing educational
opportunity that was legislated in the 1970s. The negative impact upon education has been
especially severe in communities with low property tax bases; indeed, the gap in educational
funding between the ten property-poorest towns and the ten property-richest towns has increased
from about $1,000 per student in 1989-90 to $2,000 in 1996-97. If this trend continues, the
quality of a Maine student's education will increasingly depend upon where that student lives.
It is very difficult for most Maine citizens-including legislators and local school officials- to
understand the changes in education funding since 1989-90. We hope to explain why the two
most important changes in education funding both worked to increase the disparity in funding
among towns. These two changes were (1) increasing the gap between actual operating costs and
the state's "foundation operating costs," and (2) adding income to the funding formula. Perhaps if
there is a better understanding of the funding mechanism and the recent changes, the ad hoc
political approach to education funding can be replaced with a more coherent and principled
approach.

PROPERTY TAX FUNDING OF EDUCATION
In most of the United States, elementary and secondary (K-12) education is a local responsibility,
and the primary source of local revenues is the property tax. As a result, K-12 education relies
heavily upon the property tax. How easily a community can fund its schools depends upon the
ratio of taxable property to students.
Without funding equalization, great disparities in education can result. For example, in 1996-97,
the lowest-valuation school district in Maine had about $96,000 of taxable property per student.
The highest-valuation school district had about $1,720,000 per student. The statewide annual
average cost was approximately $5,100 per student. To raise this $5,100, the lowest-valuation
district would need a tax rate of 53 mills (one mill is a tax rate of $1 per $1,000 of valuation),
while the highest-valuation district would need a tax rate of less than 3 mills. Serious problems
can be created by over-reliance on the property tax to fund K-12 education.
The differences among school districts in valuation per pupil are not determined primarily by
differences in values of primary residences. Rather, the differences in valuation usually are
determined by how much commercial, industrial, and recreational (especially waterfront)
property is within a town's boundaries. For example, in Maine the ten highest-valuation, perstudent towns include Wiscasset (with Maine Yankee), four towns with paper mills, and five
towns with extensive coast lines.
Until the 1970s, many states did little to offset the inequities of property tax funding of
education. Great disparities in spending per student developed. A combination of Court
challenges and political pressure has caused most states to adopt some kind of property tax
equalization. The goals of equalization are two-fold: student equity (to ensure an adequate
education for all students) and taxpayer equity (to promote comparable tax impacts upon
taxpayers in different jurisdictions). Although there are many ways to accomplish these
objectives, the overall goal is to ensure that all towns can fund some minimally acceptable
education programs at a reasonable mill rate.
HISTORY OF MAINE EDUCATION FUNDING
Maine has been regarded as a leader in equalizing educational opportunity across its towns.
While that leadership was most evident in the funding equalization formulas adopted in the
1970s, a state commitment to ensuring educational opportunity has been evident since statehood.
When Maine was incorporated as a state in 1820, its constitution included a provision that
directed the Legislature to ensure that public schools were available to all communities in the
state, although financing was to be a local, rather than a state, responsibility (Maine State
Legislature, 1989; Maine Department of Educational and Cultural Services, 1987; and Rydell,
1983).
The state soon became directly involved in school funding. In 1828, the Permanent School Fund
was established, which introduced the student-equity principle into school financing by
distributing funds from the sale of public lands among communities on a per-pupil basis. In
1833, the first state tax to support education was levied on the banking industry. In 1872, the

slate established the School Mill Fund, which was the genesis of the taxpayer-equity principle.
The School Mill Fund provided a pool of money for public school funding through use of a
property tax. A one mill property tax was collected from each community and redistributed on a
per-pupil basis. In 1909, the Common School Fund was established alongside the School Mill
Fund and the Permanent School Fund. The Common School Fund redistributed additional
assistance to poorer communities with low property valuations. The mill rate for the School Mill
Fund and the Common School Fund was set at 1.5 mills, and was raised to 3 mills in 1913. In
1917, the School Equalization Fund was created from the sale of timber on state land, which was
also distributed on a per-pupil basis. In 1921, all existing funds were merged into the State
School Fund.
When the Legislature delegated use of the property tax to communities in 1951, it also began to
implement the foundation formula, which would guarantee a minimum level of basic education
for each pupil in the educational system. The full foundation program was enacted in 1957.
Major changes in school funding were initiated in 1974 with the State Uniform Property Tax
system. Under this system, all communities were directed to set a specified mill rate for
education; they were to collect the tax, and turn the funds over to the state. The state returned
both its share and a school district's local share as each district's state-local allocation. During the
first year, the state share from non-property tax sources was 50% of total education costs, with
the intention of raising the state share to 55% in the second year and to 60% in the third year.
The Legislature did not implement these increases, and the state share remained at 50% during
the uniform property tax program. A provision called local leeway was added, guaranteeing a
certain dollar amount per student if school districts raised a certain number of additional mills as
specified by the state. This was essentially a state subsidy for current year programs. A highly
unpopular feature of the uniform system, which would lead to its downfall four years later, was
that any community which raised funds in excess of its local leeway was required to "pay-in" the
extra into a pool of funds that was used to help finance poorer districts.
Due to dissatisfaction with the uniform property tax, particularly to the pay-in provision, it was
repealed by referendum vote in 1978, whereupon the Legislature enacted the School Finance Act
of 1978. The School Finance Act of 1978 applied an equalization approach similar to that in the
Uniform Property Tax system. However, equalization only applied to state funds used to
supplement local property tax collections. Individual towns no longer had to pay-in funds, which
particularly allowed high-valuation towns to increase spending. The School Finance Act built a
two-year time lag into the funding mechanism, which allowed for the collection of necessary
data on spending and valuations.
The School Finance Act of 1985 required the Legislature to maintain at least the previous year's
level of state share for operating costs and program costs. The matching provision of local
leeway was eliminated, and three separate millage rates were established: an operating costs mill
rate; a program costs mill rate limit, and a debt service mill rate limit. Program costs include
special education, vocational education, early childhood education, operations of a district's
transportation system, and bus purchases. Debt service costs are the costs involved in satisfying
construction and leasing commitments for buildings. Operating costs are all costs that are not
included in the other two categories, excluding community service costs and expenditures from

any federal revenue sources. The local share of debt service costs was capped by the lesser of (1)
a maximum percent of the total debt service costs, or (2) a debt service millage limit. Similar
calculations applied for program costs. Prior to 1985, debt service was paid by every district in
the state, regardless of whether they had any debt. Under the School Finance Act of 1985, units
that have no debt do not need to raise funds for debt service.
Under the School Finance Act of 1978, if a district did not raise all of its local share, it still
received the state's share of the state-local allocation. The School Finance Act of 1985 penalized
a district that did not raise the target foundation mill rate by reducing its state subsidy
proportionately.
Beginning in 1990, the Legislature enacted a series of ad hoc reductions in the state-aid
allocation. Beginning in 1993-94, there was an explicit "reduction percentage" that was applied
to the foundation allocation. That reduction percentage acted to reduce the theoretical cost of
education to the level where the state would pay 55% of total costs.
In 1995, the Legislature revised the funding formula. The first major change added relative
income-adjusted for cost of living-to the funding formula (the implications of this change are
examined below). Second, the foundation allocation for operating costs was replaced with a "perpupil guarantee." The per-pupil guarantee was explicitly determined by the size of the state
allocation for K-12 education. The per-pupil guarantee serves the same purpose as the
"percentage reduction," but in a more transparent way.
THE MECHANICS OF THE FUNDING FORMULA
This analysis focuses on operating costs, which are approximately 75% of total costs for each
school district and which account for most of the equalization in the funding mechanism.
Program costs are about 20% of total costs, and debt service is approximately 5% of total costs.
Program costs and debt service are equalized in a somewhat similar fashion, but these items are
also subject to caps on local spending determined by local millage requirements.
To understand how recent changes affected education, this article compares fiscal year 1989-90
to 1996-97. Fiscal year 1996-97 is the most recent year for which comparison data are available.
In fiscal year 1989-90, state support for education was 55% of K-12 costs. Subsequent state
budgets have slowly eroded the state share of K- 12 funding. To simplify comparisons, the
analysis uses districts which operated both elementary and secondary schools. There are large
differences between the smaller districts that operate only elementary schools and the larger
districts that operate secondary schools.
In 1989-90, the foundation per-pupil operating cost was $2,972 (Maine Department of
Education, 1991). On average, the state paid 40% of this cost, or $1,162 per pupil. The
foundation operating cost was determined by reference to actual operating costs two years
earlier. The share of operating costs paid by the state was determined by a formula that fixed the
state share of education costs at 55%. The state paid less than 55% of operating costs because it
paid for a much larger share of program costs and debt service. In 1989-90, the 55% state share
requirement obligated state education funding to grow with local education spending, although

with a lag. From this state commitment of funds, payments were apportioned among school
districts to equalize education spending. That is, local education subsidies were structured to
offset differences in the local property base.
The state/local share of operating costs in the 1985 statute was based upon the "operating cost
mill rate." A town with exactly the average amount of property value per pupil would have to set
the operating cost mill rate as a property tax rate to raise the difference between the foundation
cost and the state subsidy for operating costs. In 1989-90, the operating cost mill rate for each
town was 6.63 mills (Maine Department of Education, 1991). The equalization formula
guaranteed that every district which raised the operating cost mill rate would receive enough
subsidy to spend at the foundation operating cost level. A town with $100,000 of property pet
student (the ten lowest-valuation districts each fell below this) received $2,309 and raised $663
(.00663 x $100,000) locally. A town with the 1989 state average of $273,000 of property per
student received $1,162 and raised $1,810 (.00663 times $273,000) locally. A town with
$600,000 of property per student (the ten highest-valuation districts were above this) could raise
$3,978 (.00663 x $600,000) locally, which exceeded the foundation level. The town with
$600,000 would, however, receive a minimum 5% contribution from the state. This town would
therefore be receiving $149 per student. This funding formula guaranteed that no town would fall
far behind the rest of the state simply because its tax base was small.
Even in 1989-90, the formula did not guarantee complete equity in spending among districts. The
foundation operating cost was actually below the state average per pupil operating cost of
$4,032. To reach the average level, an extra $1,060 per pupil was needed. The burden of raising
the extra $1,060 per pupil varied among towns. In order to raise an additional $1,060 per student,
a town with $100,000 of taxable property per student must increase the mill rate by 10.6 mills, or
160%. A town with $273,000 of property per student must raise the rate by 3.9 mills, or 59%. A
town with $600,000 per student need only to raise its mill rate by 1.77 mills, or 27%.
Not surprisingly, the poorest towns did not raise 17 mills (that is, the 6.63 operating cost mill rate
plus the 10.6 mills required to reach the average spending level) to fund education. Rather, they
tended to spend less than the state average. In 1989-90, the gap in per-student spending between
the ten property-richest towns and the ten property-poorest towns was 22%. The mill rate in the
ten lowest-valuation towns averaged about 12 mills, while the ten richest-valuation towns had an
average tax rate of about 8 mills. While the formula did not ensure either complete equality in
funding or property taxation, the disparities among towns in Maine were low in comparison to
most other states.
For fiscal year 1990-91, the Legislature faced the first of a series of budget shortfalls. Since local
education is a large part of the state budget, reductions in local education funding were
inevitable. The political climate at the time was strained. The Democratic legislature was
accusing a Republican administration of hiding the budget problems until after a gubernatorial
election. There was on-going "North versus South" dissension. In this atmosphere, the
complexities of the funding formula were a serious liability. Rather than debating how to
maintain educational equity while cutting spending, printout politics dominated.

In its decisions to reduce education subsidies, the Legislature may have been reacting to the costdriven nature of the state commitment to education. The foundation operating costs were tied to
spending in previous years, so there was a built-in tendency for educational costs to increase. As
subsidies increased, towns could spend more, which increased the subsidies in future years.
Some legislators and members of the administration seem to have believed that school districts
were not spending money carefully in this environment.
In altering the school funding formula in the 1990s, the Legislature had two choices: (1) cap the
foundation operating cost, or (2) lower the share of covered costs paid by state government. Had
it done the latter, it would have preserved the existing equalization principles. Instead, the
Legislature nominally held its share of K-12 costs at 55% by arbitrarily reducing the computed
cost of running schools.
The Legislature arrived at this result in a decidedly ad hoc fashion. For fiscal years 1990-91
through 1992-93, across-the-board cuts were applied to the state subsidies for local districts.
Beginning in fiscal year 1993-94, the Legislature reduced the foundation operating cost to match
its budget. That is, the Legislature decided how much it wanted to spend on K-12 education. A
"percentage reduction factor" was then computed, which cut the foundation allocation (and
program costs) to a level that could be funded by the budget. As a result, after applying the
reduction percentage the foundation allocation was increased only slightly between 1989-90 and
1996-97, and increases fell far behind the rate of inflation. However, the gap between the
foundation cost and the average cost grew substantially.
For fiscal years 1996-97 and thereafter, the Legislature adopted a slightly different approach to
match the allocation for operating costs to its budget. For operating costs, the foundation
allocation was replaced by a "per-pupil guarantee." To get the per-pupil guarantee, the state first
computes the total dollars available for operating costs; this is the sum of the state dollars plus
the local dollars. The state dollars are simply whatever the state allocated for operating costs.
The local dollars are computed as 6.06 mills multiplied by the total value of taxable property in
all communities. The total budget for operating costs is divided by the total number of pupils to
get the per-pupil guarantee.
There it an additional confusing element in the 1995 law: The 1995 law does keep the foundation
allocation and the reduction percentage. The reduction percentage is applied to the foundation
allocation and to program costs. After reduction, the foundation allocation is then used in the
computation of local shares for program costs and debt service. That the "foundation allocation"
persists, but in a very different role, causes considerable confusion in discussions of the latest
law.
By 1996-97, the foundation operating cost per pupil (after the percentage reduction) in Maine
had only been increased to $3,139 and the per-pupil guarantee was $3,525. The average perpupil cost in 1996-97 had increased to $5,159. The foundation tax rate for operating costs was
5.02 mills (Maine Department of Education, 1996). Figure 1 illustrates the increasing gap
between average operating cost and the operating cost used in the formula. The amount "outside
the formula" had increased from $1,060 to $1,634. Again, the burden of raising the extra $1,634
per pupil varies among towns, depending upon the amount of property tax base. To raise its total

spending to the average level of $5,159 per student, a town with $100,000 of taxable property
per student must increase the mill rate by 16.34 mills, or 325%. A town with $346,000 (the new
state average) of property per student must raise the rate by 4.72 mills, or 94%. A town with
$600,000 per student need only raise its mill rate by 2.72 mills, or 54%.
Given this increasing disparity between high-valuation and low-valuation towns, low-valuation
towns must either increase taxes or decrease spending relative to high-valuation towns. This has
come about primarily as an increasing gap in spending between the richest towns and the rest of
the state. In Figure 2, Maine's school districts are divided into four groups, or quartiles, from the
25% of K-12 districts with the lowest property valuation per pupil to the 25% with the highest
valuation per pupil. This figure shows that spending in the richest 25% of towns has moved away
from the spending in the rest of the state.
The tax data for these same quartiles is presented in Figure 3. Lower-valuation towns levied
higher tax rates in 1989-90 than high-valuation towns, and there has been little change in this
relationship in 1996-97. The data show that while most districts have responded to reduced state
subsidies by holding down spending, the richest towns have funded increased K-12 spending
from their ample property tax base. By 1996-97, the gap in spending between the ten propertypoorest towns and the ten property-richest towns had increased from 22% to 31%. Thus far, lowvaluation towns have generally resisted increasing property taxes. However, the data for the ten
lowest-valuation towns shows a slightly different effect. Between 1989-90 and 1996-97, the ten
poorest districts raised their mill rates by an average of 1.3 mills, or about 11%.
These results are perhaps unsurprising. From 1989-90 to 1996-97, the state essentially held its
spending on K-12 education constant in dollar terms. Therefore, in inflation-adjusted terms, the
state has been reducing its commitment to education by the rate of inflation, or 2% to 4% per
year. Many affected towns adjusted to these gradual changes by reducing or deferring costs in
the short run. The very poorest towns have had more difficulty adjusting, and have also increased
taxes. If the present trend continues, more towns will find it necessary to raise property tax rates,
as the lowest-valuation towns have done.
ADDING INCOME AND COST OF LIVING TO THE FUNDING FORMULA
As schools have faced lower subsidies, towns rather naturally lobbied for ways to reduce their
individual cuts. This re-opened the debate over the mechanics of the state funding formula. The
Legislature appointed a commission to look at the issue. This commission came to be known as
the Rosser Commission, after its chair, John Rosser. The Rosser Commission suggested a wide
range of changes in state funding of education. Although the Legislature ignored a large portion
of the Roster Commission's
recommendations, it did adopt the recommendation of changing the funding formula to add
household income and cost of living.
In the 1995 statute, the Legislature changed the funding formula so that local "ability-to-pay"
was no longer determined only by the ability to raise property tax revenues. Instead, 85% of the
ability-to-pay depends upon relative property values and 15% depends upon relative income. The

income factor is adjusted for local cost of living. The plausibility of the argument that income
belongs in the funding formula is easy to understand. Aren't school districts with higher incomes
better able to fund education? Won't adding income to the formula favor poorer districts?
Unfortunately, both of these apparent truths are wrong. Income has nothing to do with a school
district's ability to fund education, because the only source of revenue is the property tax. Towns
are not permitted to levy broad-based taxes, such as sales or income taxes, that are related to
income. Adding income to the formula favors property-rich towns, as we explain below.
The debate over adding income to the formula often proceeds under the assumption that
differences in home values determine the differences in the property tax base. This is a serious
error. Per-pupil valuation varies greatly because commercial, industrial, and recreational
valuations vary greatly. Some towns are fortunate to have large industrial facilities, and others
have little non-residential property. These variations have nothing to do with income. If a highvaluation town is able to lower its property tax rate when income is added to the funding
formula, much of the tax savings goes to commercial, industrial, and recreational taxpayers. One
effect of adding income to the formula may be to increase taxes in towns that rely primarily upon
taxation of primary residences and to decrease taxes in towns that rely heavily upon nonresidential property. Funding reform may have the perverse effect of shifting the responsibility
for educational funding from non-residential property onto residential property in the state as a
whole.
There has been a great deal of debate over the appropriate measure of income and how to
measure the cost of living. The Legislature appointed a committee to study how to measure these
two and how to incorporate them into the funding formula. However, focusing on how these two
factors are measured entirely overlooks the bigger picture. Regardless of how income and cost of
living are measured, adding income and cost of living to the formula increases the disparities in
educational funding in the state. Using income (adjusted for cost of living) to determine 15% of
the ability-to-fund education is virtually identical to assuming that all communities have an equal
ability to fund 15% of the costs of education. Reducing the level of spending that is being
equalized benefits high-valuation towns at the expense of low-valuation towns.
While differences in per-pupil valuation are very large, the differences in median household
income among towns in Maine are relatively small. The highest-valuation per-pupil town has
about seventeen times more valuation per pupil than the lowest-valuation district, or $1.7 million
versus about $100,000. The difference between the highest median-income district is only about
three times as great as the poorest median-income district: $47,000 in the richest town versus
$16,000 in the poorest town.
Figure 4 illustrates the differences in variation of valuation versus income. (Both valuation and
income have been standardized by dividing by their averages.) Replacing valuation with income
replaces a factor that varies substantially with one that varies much less. If a town has both
below-average valuation and below-average income, its subsidy must be reduced as income
replaces valuation in the formula. Conversely, an above-average valuation and above-average
income town will see its subsidy rise as income replaces valuation in the formula. This explains
the apparent political contradiction that above-average income regions of the state favor adding
income to the formula, while low-income regions oppose adding income.

Of course, the measurement of income and cost of living is not an irrelevant issue if these factors
are included in the formula. Measuring these two components generates a range of issues, both
conceptional and technical. There is no source of cost-of-living data at the town level, so an
index had to be developed specifically for use in the funding formula. Computing cost-of-living
indices requires a great deal of careful and expensive work. It would be cost-prohibitive to use
the same methodology as the federal government applies, but a less-rigorous approach is difficult
to defend either economically or politically. Even the proponents of cost-of-living indices seem
prepared to concede that the low-budget approach currently in use is difficult to defend.
A number of measures of local income are available from U.S. Census data, but converting these
income measures into an index of economic welfare involves some complexities. The state chose
median household income, which is a frequently used measure. However, this measure
incorporates the problematic concept of the definition of a household. An income of $25,000 for
a household of one is quite different from $25,000 for a household of five. Single-adult
households tend to have lower household income but higher per-capita income than families. If
all communities had a similar mix of small and large households, this would create minimal
problems. But cities have many more single-person households than smaller towns. For example,
Portland has a median income for families of $34,837, which is above the state median of
$32,422 for families. Portland's median income for single-person households is $18,357, which
is well above the state median for single-person households of $15,514. However, Portland's
median household income of $26,576 is actually below the state median of $27,854. This
apparent contradiction occurs because Portland has many more single person households (U.S.
Census Bureau, 1990).
ALTERNATIVE EQUITY GOALS IN FUNDING EQUALIZATION
There is no single equity objective in the design of an education funding formula. Rather, there
are at least three different equity objectives. First, there is the goal of providing equity in
educational opportunity for students in different districts. Second, there is the aim of providing
equity in the treatment of property in different towns. Third, there is the objective of providing
equity in the treatment of households in different towns. There are some inherent conflicts
among these different goals.
Maine's 1985 funding formula was relatively effective in achieving the first objective, equity in
per-student funding. The pre-1990s funding system set a realistic minimum per-pupil
expenditure guarantee. While high-valuation districts could and did spend more than lowvaluation districts, these differentials were small in comparison to most other states. However, as
the foundation per-pupil operating cost was reduced further below actual operating costs, equity
in per-student funding has suffered. In six years the gap in spending between high-valuation
districts and the rest of the state nearly doubled.
The 1985 funding formula was also effective in pursuing the second goal, equity in property tax
rates across towns. Every town could achieve a reasonable minimum level of spending at the
state average mill rate, so mill rates on property were quite similar across the state. Again, the
high-valuation towns had somewhat lower mill rates, but these differences were small in
comparison to many other states. Since the low-valuation towns generally responded to funding

reductions by reducing spending, the changes in the funding formula have not had an appreciable
impact upon relative mill rates.
The third equity concern, over treatment of similarly situated residential taxpayers, has become
more important in recent debates over revising the equalization formula. By design, Maine's
1985 funding formula worked to equalize property tax mill rates, not property tax payments.
Two specific taxpayer equity issues have been raised. First, do households with similar incomes
pay higher property taxes because home values vary, even if mill rates are similar? (This
question is prompted largely by higher real estate values in southern Maine.) Second, there are
complaints that some districts, which receive large subsidies, cut their property taxes, rather than
expand educational opportunities for their students.
The extent to which differences in real estate values create inequities among residential
taxpayers cannot be assessed with current data. Appropriate town-level data on the relation
between incomes and home values is not available. The only data, from the U.S. Census, on
housing values and income cannot be compared. Census data reports median income for all
households and median home value for all owner-occupied units. In towns where much of the
population lives in rental units, the median owner-occupied unit is not owned by the median
household. For example in Portland, only 42% of the housing units are owner-occupied, so the
median house value of $112,000 is not owned by a family with the median income. In a rural
town such as Bradford, where 82% are owner-occupied, the median house value of $57,300
more accurately reflects the home owned by the median family (U.S. Census Bureau, 1990).
Unfortunately, the Census data has been misrepresented in public presentations by some in
southern Maine to argue that the problem is obvious. In principle, the state could answer the
question by linking property tax records and state income tax records. In light of the political
importance of this issue, development of such data, or at least a representative sample, may
become necessary.
The second concern-over the failure of some towns that receive a high state subsidy to raise
adequate taxes-is easily assessed. On average, the mill rates in the lowest-valuation towns are
higher than mill rates in towns with higher valuations. The data presented in Figure 3 indicates
that mill rates are 20% higher in low-valuation towns than in high-valuation towns. However; in
a few towns, this criticism may have some validity. Simply by examining the tax ratios in highreceiving towns, there do seem to be a small number that have opted for lower-tax rates. The
funding formula already penalizes towns that fail to tax themselves at some minimum level. By
adjusting this penalty mechanism (for example, more than one dollar of state revenues lost for
every dollar not raised locally) and by raising the minimum mill rate, it should be easy to
eliminate free-riding on the state subsidy.
POLICY OPTIONS
The educational funding mechanism in Maine is complex enough to make policy development
difficult. We hope that our explanation may have clarified both the formula and the impact of the
post-1989 changes. Still, where does this understanding lead?

The simple conclusion might be that increasing the state funding of K-12 education back to
inflation-adjusted levels of the 1980s would substantially reduce the disagreement surrounding
the funding formula. If the pie were no longer shrinking, the arguments over exactly how to cut
the pie would dissipate. In the current formula, increasing funding would directly increase the
per-pupil guarantee. But neither the Legislature nor the Governor seem inclined to commit
substantially more funds to local education. Increased state taxes are very unlikely. Further, the
last session of the Legislature suggests that local education will not be able to take large blocks
of money from competing uses of state revenues. Solving the conflict by raising subsidies is not
likely.
It is clear that any concept of student equity requires that funding be available in every school
district to provide minimally adequate education. In any formula that uses a foundation operating
cost or per-pupil guarantee, this foundation cost must reflect the real cost of meeting a minimum
standard. The Legislature made a serious error in tying this figure to its falling budget, rather
than to the costs of education. That is not to say that using average costs-as was done before
1989-is necessarily appropriate, but the current foundation cost and per-pupil guarantee are well
below the actual costs of even the lowest-spending town. No one could defend the current
foundation cost as sufficient to fund an adequate minimum standard in education.
Fortunately, the 1995 changes to the funding mechanism provide a simple way to increase the
per-pupil guarantee to a realistic level without increasing state aid. The per-pupil guarantee is too
low because the mill rate to compute the target local contribution is set in the statute at 6.06
mills. In fact, the average mill rate raised for operating costs (that is, excluding the local
revenues that go to program costs and debt service) is about 9 mills. By raising the local
contribution used in the formula to the actual average level, the per-pupil guarantee would
increase to a realistic level. For example, if the 1996-97 per-pupil guarantee were computed
using a 9 mill local contribution, the per-pupil guarantee would have been about $4,600.
While we have not focused on program costs or debt service in this analysis, there are two
technical changes on the distribution of these costs that would also improve equity. First, the per
pupil guarantee should be used to determine the local share, rather than the foundation operating
cost (the foundation operating cost is an anachronism of previous statutes). Second, the millage
caps on program costs and debt costs should be linked in some way to total local mill rates. At
present, a town with a very low mill rate of 5 mills for education has the same mill-rate cap for
debt service (about .5 mills) as a town raising a high rate of 15 mills. These caps decrease equity
under the current system. A single millage cap on all expenses would be more equalizing than
the individual caps on program costs and debt service.
The way to correct the effect of adding income to the formula is clear: remove income and cost
of living from the formula. Adding income to the formula has proven an inappropriate way to
improve taxpayer equity. The Legislature has found a much more appropriate way to address
taxpayer equity: through the homestead exemption of $7,000 per residence. Having acted to
address equity outside the formula, the Legislature can let the funding formula revert to its
original purpose: to ensure an adequate minimum level of education funding in all communities.

Finally, there is the question of how to address the perceived inequities created by differences in
residential real estate values. The circuit-breaker program and the new homestead-exemption
program directly address taxpayer equity. If inequities are created by the differences in real
estate values within the state, then the obvious way to address this problem is through
modifications to one or both of these programs. For example, the homestead exemption could
vary with the level of the real estate prices. Dealing directly with taxpayer equity through
modifications to the circuit-breaker and homestead-exemption programs avoids the problems that
have been created by trying to manipulate the formula to address this problem.
We have suggested a three-part approach to restoring equity to the distribution of school aid,
while also addressing concerns over taxpayer equity. First, by setting a realistic local operating
cost mill rate, raise the per-pupil guarantee to a level that affords an adequate education. Second,
remove income and cost of living from the formula; the property tax base is the only local
revenue source available to fund schools, and it alone determines the ability-to-fund education.
Third, address the concerns over unequal home values by modifying the circuit-breaker and
homestead-exemption programs.
Maine addressed fundamental questions about equity in educational opportunity and in taxpayer
equity when it established the school funding formula of the 1970s. Maine clearly articulated the
principle that every district should be able to achieve a minimum spending level at a reasonable
mill rate. However, Maine is slowly abandoning the principles of those earlier decisions. Some
amendment of those principles may indeed be warranted; both the definition of pupil-equity and
of taxpayer-equity may require redefinition, but the de facto replacement for these carefully
constructed principles has been political self-interest. Educational funding in Maine in the 1990s
has been overwhelmed by the divisive politics of carving up a shrinking pie. When school
districts face unpleasant cuts, a parent's first instinct will be to resist those cuts for their children's
schools. Every parent is understandably concerned about the quality of education for his or her
children. However, we refuse to believe that the commitment to public education in Maine has
become so shallow that we cannot see the difference between being concerned about one's own
children and being concerned about only one's own children. Maine's historic commitment to
equality in educational opportunity bespeaks a civic conscience that cherishes the future of all of
our children.
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